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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Little doubt exists that despite “zero tolerance” policies, increased sensitivity 
training, and other measures designed to eliminate or at least minimize sexual 
harassment in the military, female service members are still subjected to pervasive 
sexual harassment.  Although both co-authors have proposed the abolition of the 
military courts-martial system in time of peace3 and one has proposed the repeal of 
the so-called Feres doctrine which prohibits servicemembers from suing their 
military commanders for monetary damages,4 perhaps stronger reasons exist to 
replace courts-martial with civil rights lawsuits for sexual harassment offenses 
committed by servicemembers.  This article will review the current status of sexual 
harassment in the military, discuss why courts-martial are ineffective in punishing 
and deterring sexual harassment, and suggest that permitting sexual harassment 
claims in a forum other than the military justice system would help deter future 
sexual harassment in the military at no greater cost to military discipline and 
preparedness than is inherent in the current system. 
                                                                
1Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, B.S. 1958; J.D. 1961, De Paul 
University; L.L.M. 1962, Northwestern University.  Professor Spak is a retired reserve colonel 
in the Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps and author of CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
MILITARY LAW. 
2Partner, Tomes & Dvorak, Leawood, Kansas; B.S. 1968, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 
1975, Oklahoma City University.  Mr. Tomes is a retired lieutenant colonel in the Army Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps and author of THE SERVICEMEMBER’S LEGAL GUIDE (3d ed). 
3Michael Spak & Jonathan Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps? 28 S.W. U. L.REV. 
481 (2000). 
4See Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley:  Three Strikes and Servicemembers 
are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 (1990). 
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II.  SEXUAL HARASSMENT—A CONTINUING PROBLEM FOR TODAY’S MILITARY 
Despite increased training in the prevention of sexual harassment,5 “zero 
tolerance” policies,6 and highly publicized courts-martial of those accused of sexual 
harassment,7 sexual harassment continues to be a problem for the United States 
military.  For example, Naval investigators reported 156 cases of inappropriate 
relationships between January 1996 and May 1998 at Great Lakes Naval Base, where 
the Navy conducts its basic training.  Among these cases were 14 cases of sexual 
harassment of recruits by instructors.8  Not only do investigations and disciplinary 
                                                                
5See STATEMENT AND STATUS REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY 
TRAINING, “GENDER - RELATED ISSUES IN MILITARY TRAINING,” 1999 WL 8086648 (March 17, 
1999), which notes, for example, that the Army now includes prevention of sexual harassment 
as a part of basic combat training, and equal opportunity and sexual harassment training as 
part of the Pre-Command Course, Cadre Training Course and others. 
6An article in the Naval Law Review defined a “zero tolerance” sexual harassment policy 
as one that “means that every individual complaint of sexual harassment will be investigated 
and that the individuals involved in the ‘unwanted’ sexual attention will be brought to justice.”  
Kristin K. Heimark, Sexual Harassment in the United States Navy: A New Pair of Glasses, 44 
NAVAL L. REV. 223, n. 9 (1997).  The Navy announced its “zero tolerance” policy in 1989 
when Navy Secretary Lawrence Garret issued the following instruction: 
Sexual harassment is unacceptable conduct; it undermines the integrity of the 
employment relationship, debilitates morale, and interferes with the work productivity 
of an organization.  Sexual harassment will not be tolerated at any level.  Substantiated 
acts of or conduct which results in sexual harassment shall result in corrective action.  
Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5300.26A 
(1989). 
Criticism of the “zero tolerance” policy focuses on the belief that the military professes zero 
tolerance easily but fails to enforce it: 
The military professes to have “zero tolerance” of sexual harassment, with elaborate 
policies to define and prevent offenses.  Unfortunately, the phrase “zero tolerance” has 
become a parody of itself, more accurately referring to things the military doesn’t 
really care to do anything about.  Instead of taking action to enforce a policy and 
eliminate problem behavior, which the military is historically quite effective in doing, 
it is much easier to just proclaim there is “zero tolerance” and move on to something 
else. 
Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the End for Women in the Military, 48 U. FLA. L. REV. 461, 
464 (1996). 
7Perhaps the most notorious trial was that of the Sergeant Major of the Army, Gene 
McKinney, for sexual harassment, allegedly consisting of pressuring subordinates for dates, 
forced kissing, and boasting of his sexual prowess to female subordinates.  Sergeant Major 
McKinney was acquitted by general court-martial of all sexual harassment charges and 
convicted of one specification of obstruction of justice for attempting to coach the testimony 
of one of his accusers.  See e.g., Stephen Komarow, Army Sex Scandal Reaches Higher, 
Service’s Top Enlisted Man Faces Charges, USA TODAY, May 8, 1997, at 3A; Jane Gross, 
Former Top Sergeant of Army is Acquitted of All Sex Charges, NY TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at 
A1; Jane Gross, When Character Counts,  NY TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, at A1.  Certainly some 
irony exists in being convicted of trying to cover up crimes one was found not guilty of. 
8Navy Report: Sexual Harassment Not Pervasive at Coed Boot Camp, THE STATE 
JOURNAL-REGISTER, Dec. 26, 1998, (Local) at 12.  If 156 cases is not pervasive, what is? 
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actions9 indicate that harassment continues, but also so do formal reports and 
scholarly writings.10  This continued problem with sexual harassment not only harms 
the victims, but also harms the morale, discipline, and effectiveness of our fighting 
forces.  Some see these adverse effects as a part of the legacy of the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to make the military reflect the wider American society as 
shown by mandating the Navy to assign women to all combat ships.11  One woman 
commentator noted: 
Bill Clinton’s tenure in office has been quite damaging to the military.  
Readiness has suffered terribly.  Morale is very low.  And attrition is 
leaving the Air Force with a shortage of pilots and the Navy with a 
shortage of officers. 
Because the Clinton administration has been determined to advance 
the cause of women in combat, the military has been plagued by sexual 
harassment, rape, pregnancy and low morale. . . .12 
This commentator is not alone in her concern.  Regardless of whether the 
problems the military is experiencing are attributable to the Clinton administration; 
to an inherent “warrior mentality” in the male-dominated military;13 or to poorly 
                                                                
9E.g., Amanda Vogt, Ex-Navy Instructor Admits to Sex Charges, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 
7, 1998, (Metro Lake) at 1 (Navy Petty Officer sentenced to a demotion, a bad-conduct 
discharge, and 198 days confinement for pleading guilty to sexual harassment and 
fraternization with recruits); Sailor in Sex Case Still Unhappy, AP ONLINE 1998 WL 21782521 
(Nov. 3, 1998) (reporting the victim of sexual harassment’s dissatisfaction with nonjudicial 
punishment taken against the commander of a Navy destroyer who made suggestive comments 
and kissed her.  The maximum punishment he could receive (the actual punishment was not 
reported) was 30 days restriction and a punitive letter of reprimand). 10 U.S.C. § 815 art. 15 
(1999) (hereinafter U.C.M.J.) permits commanders to impose various punishments, depending 
on the rank of the commander and the servicemember being punished without a trial by court-
martial. 
10See e.g., William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress App. G, Table G-2 (1998) (detailing the high number of sexual harassment 
complaints filed with the Department of Defense between 1987 and 1996); MARGARET C. 
HARRELL & LAURA L. MILLER, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY WOMEN:  EFFECTS UPON 
READINESS, COHESION, AND MORALE 73-77 (1997). 
11Paul Craig Roberts, The ‘Can-do’ Curse . . . and Fade-out, THE WASHINGTON TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 1999) at A18. 
12Mona Charen, Editorial: What is Sapping the Spirit of America’s Military, THE 
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, (Oct. 26, 1998) at A04. 
13See LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY 152 
(1997).  This author describes the warrior culture as one that demands women’s 
marginalization because accepting women as peers would by antithetical to the macho identity 
encouraged by the military.  Id. at 157.  Professional soldiers, however, maintain that the 
warrior culture is necessary to develop combat soldiers.  One marine infantryman stated, “You 
can call [the warrior culture] BS but until someone comes up with a better way to get terrified 
18-year-olds to stand up in front of machine guns . . . I’m sticking with it.”  Thomas E. Ricks, 
U.S. Army Fights to Recruit Amid Less- Macho Image, WALL STREET J. EUR., (Jul. 17, 1997), 
at 4 (quoting John Lundy). 
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thought-out policies to combat sexual harassment,14 sexual harassment and the 
methods used to remedy it continue to cause problems for commanders and those 
they lead.  For example, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services 
(DACOWITS) reported that male supervisors feared their superiors would not 
support them if they tried to hold women accountable, and subordinate females 
feared that this situation harmed their opportunity to be treated as equals.15   
The solutions to these problems may actually exacerbate the problems women 
face in the military.  Professor Diane H. Mazur, a former Air Force officer, in an 
article which demonstrates a great insight into the military, has noted that potential 
solutions, although advanced by those who support greater military participation by 
women, “are more dangerous because they are superficially protective and 
supportive, yet unwittingly they will erode the already uncertain status of military 
women even further.”16  She believes that the solutions are based on an incorrect 
assumption—that women are incapable of resisting inappropriate sexual behavior or, 
in many cases, of reporting it: 
The military has already taken a number of steps to prevent future 
instances of sexual misconduct against women recruits and, at least so far, 
the military’s actions have been applauded.  In particular, the Army has 
increased supervision of recruits, has moved to severely punish past 
offenders, and is devising new systems for reporting misconduct.  
Unfortunately, these actions have been myopically short-term in nature.  
Each carries a long-term danger for women in the military, and in the 
hurry “to do something,” little attention has been paid to whether they are 
doing more harm than good.17 
As examples of “fixes” that are contraproductive, Professor Mazur cites training 
regulations which prohibit trainees from going anywhere alone.  She believes that 
such a policy, that women must be protected from harm by restricting their liberty, is 
similar to the rationale behind prohibiting women in combat, that no one on the 
battlefield can protect women from attacks by their fellow soldiers.18  Further, , in 
her view, prosecutors often only discipline the men, where both men and women 
                                                                
14See, e.g., Tom Bowman, Army Officers Fear Dating Ban May Hurt Bonds Within Units:  
Cohen Expected to OK Policy Soon; He Wants Same Code Among All Branches, THE DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS (Jan. 3, 1999) at 9A (ban on socializing between junior officers and their 
sergeants would harm camaraderie and unit cohesion).  A very-well thought out article 
postulates that “more so than in other areas of the law, the legal regulation of sexual conduct 
has been characterized by inattention and panic, minimization and overreaction.”  Martha 
Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 305, 306 (1998) (the military is a dramatic illustration of the inattention/panic 
contradiction leading to the conclusion that curing the problem of sexual harassment by the 
resegregation of women in basic training stems from faulty logic that confuses sexual 
harassment with heterosexuality, and mistakes power for sexual desire). 
15Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon Finds Less Harassment; Officers Cite ‘Fear’ of Women, 
THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Dec. 10, 1998) at A1. 
16Mazur, supra note 6, at 42. 
17Id. at 465. 
18Id. at 466. 
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have engaged in inappropriate but consensual relationships.  The problem with this is 
that exempting women from responsibility diminishes their service and sets a poor 
precedent for the future.19  Finally, new systems for reporting misconduct are 
unlikely to be productive because they do not use the chain of command.  Using the 
chain of command is ingrained in all servicemembers, but once one goes outside it to 
report a problem, that problem is no longer a priority for the command: 
Policies that encourage women to take their complaints outside the chain 
of command are the worst possible way to approach the problem of sexual 
misconduct.  If we tell the military that it is incapable of preventing sexual 
misconduct, it will never become capable.  If we tell individual 
supervisors and commanders that they are incompetent to respond to 
women’s concerns, they will remain incompetent.20 
In short, sexual harassment continues to be a major problem for the military.  
Further, the existing system for dealing with sexual harassment does not appear to be 
adequate to deal with the problem.  Rather, both the existing system and recent 
“fixes” appear to be exacerbating the problem—harming both the military and those 
the system is designed to protect.  While scholars have proposed a number of 
solutions,21 this article will focus on the forum for adjudicating harassment cases—
the court-martial—and suggest another forum—the civil lawsuit for sexual 
harassment—would better reduce the problem and protect potential victims of such 
harassment. 
III.  COURTS-MARTIAL FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT—THE WRONG SYSTEM AND THE 
WRONG FACTFINDER 
The military justice system, including courts-martial, was hardly designed to 
determine whether a female servicemember was the victim of sexual harassment by 
another servicemember.22  Nor are the factfinders in this system particularly suited 
                                                                
19Id. at 467-69.  The author does not suggest that men should not be punished as severely 
as has occurred, nor that women should be punished as severely.  The punishment should be 
related to the degree of culpability which will normally result in a higher-ranking male being 
punished more severely than a lower-ranking female.  Id. at 467. 
20Id. at 470. 
21Chamallas, supra note 14, at 361-63 (rename and reorient the offense of fraternization 
because in its current “sexualized meaning,” the rules are incoherent and place too much 
emphasis on the dangers of sexual conduct as opposed to overly-familiar behavior, and reduce 
or eliminate broad bans on consensual conduct outside the chain of command); Yxta Maya 
Murray, Sexual Harassment in the Military, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 279, 290-91 
(1994) (extend Title VII to uniformed personnel). 
22Besides the lack of women in the military at the time our military justice system was 
created, little doubt exists that it was viewed as an instrument of discipline, not a system of 
justice.  See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (off-post offenses must be 
“service-connected” for courts-martial jurisdiction) (“A court-martial is not yet an independent 
instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall 
mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.”) overruled by Solorio v. United States, 
483 U.S. 435 (1987) (active duty status at the time of the offense is sufficient for jurisdiction); 
JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 21-24 (1974). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
340 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:335 
for making this type of determination, whether the factfinder is a commander who is 
deciding whether the allegation is substantiated so as to require disciplinary action 
against the offender, whether the factfinder is a convening authority deciding 
whether to try a case by court-martial, or whether the factfinder is a court-martial 
panel trying to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether to convict an accused 
harasser. 
The problems with the military justice system itself are exacerbated by sexual 
harassment cases.  The first problem is that commanders, not lawyers, decide what, if 
any disciplinary action to take.  While under Rules for Court-Martial (hereinafter 
R.C.M.) 301, any person may report an offense subject to trial by court-martial, any 
military authority who receives such a report must forward it to the suspect’s 
immediate commander.  Upon receiving such a report, the commander should make 
a preliminary inquiry into the allegations.23  Under R.C.M. 306, each commander has 
the discretion to dispose of offenses by members of his or her command.  A 
commander may take any of the following actions: 
• No action.24 
• Administrative action, such as an administrative separation.25 
• Nonjudicial punishment.26 
• Trial by court-martial.27 
 
If the commander believes that the offense is too serious to dispose of at his or 
her level, the commander may forward the matter to a superior authority for 
disposition.28  Lower-level commanders may not convene courts-martial,29 for 
                                                                
23RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (hereinafter R.C.M) 303. 
24R.C.M. 306(c)(1). 
25The MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (hereinafter M.C.M.) lists the following possible 
administrative actions a commander may take in response to a reported offense: counseling, 
admonition, reprimand, exhortation, disapproval, criticism, censure, reproach, rebuke, extra 
military instruction, or the administrative withholding of privileges in R.C.M. 306(c)(2).  
Other administrative measures include adverse efficiency or academic reports, reassignment, 
career field reclassification, reduction in grade, bar to reenlistment, security clearance 
revocation, pecuniary liability for negligence or misconduct (as if the offense damaged 
military property), and administrative separation.  Id., Discussion. 
26R.C.M. 306(c)(3).  See note 9, supra, for a short summary of a commander’s powers to 
impose nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, U.C.M.J. 
27R.C.M. 306(c)(4). 
28R.C.M. 306(c)(5). 
2910 U.S.C. §§ 822-824, specify who may convene general, special, and summary courts-
martial.  A general court-martial may adjudge any penalty specified for the offense under the 
punitive articles of 10 U.S.C. §§ 880-934, including the death penalty, confinement for life, 
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and total 
forfeitures of pay and allowances.  10 U.S.C. § 818.  A special court may adjudge a bad-
conduct discharge, confinement for not more than six months, reduction to the lowest enlisted 
grade, and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for six months.  10 U.S.C. § 819.  A 
summary court may only adjudge confinement for not more than one month, and forfeiture of 
two-thirds of one month’s pay.  10 U.S.C. § 820.  All these courts-martial can adjudge other 
penalties, such as reprimands, restriction to specified limits, and the like.  Under Article 22, 
above, a typical Army general-martial convening authority, for example, is a general officer 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/5
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example, and the nonjudicial punishments they may impose are less severe than 
those which higher commanders may impose.  In making these decisions, 
commanders often get advice from judge advocates as to how to dispose of offenses, 
but do not have to do so except if referring30 a case to a court-martial.  And even in 
those cases, they do not have to follow the advice.  In both authors’ experience as 
judge advocates, it was not uncommon for a commander to not follow legal advice as 
to whether to try a particular offense by court-martial or not.  Sometimes 
commanders ordered a trial when the lawyer advised otherwise and sometimes they 
refused to order a trial when the lawyer urged that the offense was so serious that no 
other means of disposition was appropriate.  If the lawyer disagrees, his or her only 
recourse is to ask a superior commander to take away the subordinate’s authority to 
act and persuade the senior to order trial by court-martial, an act that hardly endears 
the lawyer to the subordinate commander, who may be sitting on the lawyer’s next 
promotion board.31 
While a commander’s ability to prosecute a case or not prosecute a case against 
the advice of military lawyers may either subject an innocent servicemember to trial, 
subject a guilty servicemember to a far more severe sanction imposed by a court-
martial than is warranted, or permit a guilty servicemember to avoid criminal 
liability in any type of case, the potential for making a bad decision as to how to 
dispose of a sexual harassment case is even greater for the following reasons: 
• Evaluation of a sexual harassment case is far more complicated than 
deciding whether a servicemember should be punished for absence without 
leave.32 Professor Chamallas, in her article on the military’s “gender panic,” 
opines that this panic lumps both coercive and consensual sexual conduct 
into the same undifferentiated source, biological urges, which results in 
commanders treating rapists as if they caused the same type of injuries to 
persons who have committed adultery.33  Further, because most commanders 
are male, and the senior ones are usually older males, they may have 
difficulty divorcing themselves from a culture that has historically viewed 
sexual harassment as unimportant.34 
                                                          
commanding an Army division, separate brigade, or major installation.  A typical Army 
special court-martial convening authority is a brigade, separate battalion, or small installation 
commander under Article 23.  A typical Army summary court-martial convening authority is a 
battalion or separate company commander under Article 24.  See generally Stephen A. Lamb, 
The Court-Martial Panel Selection Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103, 125 
(1992). 
30
“Referral” is “the order of a convening authority that charges against an accused will be 
tried by a specified court-martial.”  R.C.M. 601(a). 
31R.C.M. 306(a) notes that a superior commander may withhold the authority to dispose of 
offenses in individual cases, types of cases, or generally. 
3210 U.S.C. § 886 (2000) criminalizes leaving one’s military unit without authority. 
33Chamallas, supra note 14, at 320. 
34Douglas R. Kay, Comment, Running a Gauntlet of Sexual Abuse: Sexual Harassment of 
Female Naval Personnel in the United States Navy, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 307, 330 (1992) 
(citing Kay Krohne, The Effect of Sexual Harassment on Female Naval Officers: A 
Phenomenological Study at 178) (unpublished Ed. D. dissertation, University of San Diego) 
(on file with author).  For a discussion of the effects of the military’s culture on sexual 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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• Political correctness pressures, media pressures, and the like may lead to bad 
decisions.  Such pressures can cause the commander to either prosecute a 
servicemember he or she shouldn’t or, strangely enough, prevent 
prosecutions that should occur.  Professor Chamallas has noted the 
phenomenon that the excessive media coverage of the numerous military sex 
cases creates the impression that things have gone too far and it is time to 
stop the accusations.35  In addition, media saturation has generated a high 
degree of skepticism about the legitimacy of complaints of sexual 
harassment.36  Finally, commanders, out of fear of the post-Tailhook 
bloodletting (which destroyed careers or delayed promotions) may tend to 
err “on the side of inquisition, persecution, and recrimination.”37 
• Further, commanders have a strong incentive not to find a sexual harassment 
claim to be valid.  Finding that one of his or her subordinates sexually 
harassed another may well indicate to the commander’s superiors that he or 
she does not have an effective program to combat sexual harassment.  
Further, if the media gets involved, it makes not only the immediate unit, but 
higher units, and the military service itself look bad.  Such problems are 
hardly career-enhancing: 
At each level of the chain, the superior officer has discretion concerning how to 
deal with the complaint.  Additionally, each superior has a vested interest in what is 
termed in naval aviation parlance “covering your six.” Each individual is held 
responsible for the personnel below them.  Covering your six can lead to many 
complaints being hidden or ignored.  Investigations into a complaint attract attention 
to the problem, and a problem looks bad for the superior responsible.38 
Assuming that the commander makes a proper decision to send a sexual 
harassment case to a court-martial,39 the issue remains whether a court-martial is a 
                                                          
harassment and other sex crimes, see FRANCKE, supra note 13, at 152, 190; Murray, supra 
note 21, at 296-97; Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the 
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 525 (1991). 
35Chamallas, supra, note 14, at 320. 
36Id. at 321. 
37Bruce T. Smith, Tempting the Better Part of Valor, 44-FEB FED. LAW. 13, 13 (Feb. 
1977). 
38Krohne, supra, note 34, at 331 (citing DOROTHY SCHNEIDER & CARL SCHNEIDER, SOUND 
OFF?  AMERICAN MILITARY WOMEN SPEAK OUT 47 (1988) (“Usually the physical assaults 
servicewomen told us about were reported but handled semiofficially, at as low a level as 
possible, by people who wished to quiet the troubled waters or swim out of them.”).  Id. 
39The MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL provides the following guidance to commanders as 
to how to dispose of offenses: 
(b) Policy.  Allegations of offenses should be disposed of in a timely manner and the 
lowest appropriate level of disposition listed in subsection (c) of this rule: (see supra 
notes 20-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dispositions authorized by 
R.C.M. 306(c)). 
Discussion 
The disposition decision is one of the most important and difficult decisions facing a 
commander.  Many factors must be taken into consideration and balanced, including, 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/5
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proper forum for a sexual harassment case.  Among the many problems with the 
court-martial system in general are: courts-martial are not sitting courts, but rather 
are “convened” by commanders; commanders select the court-members (jurors); 
commanders decide, subject to review by the military judge, on many pretrial 
motions, such as discovery motions and motions to produce witnesses; commanders 
enter into plea bargains with defendants or immunize witnesses to induce them to 
testify, and so-called “command influence” can taint the trial.  These problems may 
make arriving at a proper decision unlikely in a court-martial.  In addition, other 
aspects of the military justice system, which may not lead to unfair decisions in other 
cases, such as the requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the non-
unanimous jury verdict requirement in a court-martial, may prevent reaching a 
proper decision in a sexual harassment case. 
Courts-martial are not sitting courts, but rather comprise ad hoc tribunals to 
which commanders may refer one or more cases for trial.40  The same problems with 
commanders investigating and disposing of sexual harassment complaints apply to 
convening authorities’41 decisions whether to send a sexual harassment case to trial 
by court-martial.  First, as one military court-martial illustrated, the convening 
authority may not be the one who should make decisions as to whether a sexual 
harassment claim goes to trial.  In United States v. Kroop,42 the convening authority 
in a sexual harassment case was being investigated for sexual crimes of a similar 
nature to those of the accused.  The military appellate court did not find these facts 
relevant to disqualify the convening authority.43  Would a civilian criminal justice 
system allow a prosecutor under investigation for a crime make decisions about 
defendants charged with similar crimes?  In addition, the higher ranking commander 
who convenes courts-martial and refers cases to them, may have difficulty evaluating 
a sexual harassment case, may be pressured by the media or others, or may want to 
cover-up a harassment case to avoid looking as if such problems exist in his or her 
command, rather than referring the case to trial.44 
The difficulty with evaluating a case at the convening authority level, as opposed 
to a lower level, is that the convening authority who believes the offense is serious 
                                                          
to the extent practicable, the nature of the offenses, any mitigating or extenuating 
circumstances, the character and military service of the accused, any recommendations 
made by subordinate commanders, the interests of justice, military exigencies, and the 
effect of the decision on the accused and the command.  The goal should be a 
disposition that is warranted, appropriate, and fair. 
* * * *  [listing factors, such as (D) possible improper motives of the accuser and (E) 
reluctance of the victim or others to testify. 
R.C.M. 306(b). 
40JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 27 (1974).  See 
also WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920). 
41See supra note 25. 
42United States v. Kroop, 34 M.J. 628 (A.F.C.M.R.1992), aff'd, 38 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 
1993). 
43Kroop, 34 M.J. at 632. 
44See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
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enough to warrant trial by court-martial must decide what charges apply.  Even with 
lawyers drafting the charges, doing so is not easy because the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice does not, in terms, prohibit sexual harassment.  Although the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has defined sexual harassment,45 convening 
authorities must choose between a number of potential charges, none of which may 
cover conduct that constitutes sexual harassment under the DOD standard.  An act of 
sexual harassment may constitute “cruelty and maltreatment of a subordinate,”46 
extortion,47 indecent language,48 provoking words and gestures,49 disorderly 
conduct,50 and/or fraternization.51  If the harassment involves physical contact, it may 
                                                                
45The Department of Defense definition of sexual harassment, which applies to both 
military members and civilian employees, is as follows: 
Sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature when: 
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or 
condition of a person’s job, pay, or career; or 
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career 
or employment decisions affecting that person; or 
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment. 
MEMORANDUM, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TO SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, 
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE 
AGENCIES, SUBJECT:   PROHIBITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
(DOD), Aug. 22, 1994, at 1. 
4610 U.S.C. § 893 (2000).  This article will often apply to sexual harassment cases, but 
cases interpreting this article are ambiguous as to whether it criminalizes maltreatment of 
direct subordinates only or extends to any lower-ranking personnel.  Compare United States v. 
Hullett, 40 M.J. 189 (C.M.A. 1994) (sexually-oriented statements to a junior may violate 
Article 93) with United States v. Curry, 28 M.J. 419 (C.M.A. 1989) (remanding because even 
though the alleged victim was junior, the appellant had no authority over her).  See William T. 
Barto, Sexual Harassment and the Uniform Code of Military Justice:  A Primer for the 
Military Justice Practitioner, ARMY LAW.  ARMY LAW, at 4-6 (July 1995).  Further, voluntary 
acts between the victim and the accused may exonerate the accused.  Id., at 7-8. 
47The U.C.M.J. defines extortion as communicating a threat with the intent to obtain 
anything of value.  10 U.S.C. § 927 (2000).  Sexual favors qualify as something of value.  
United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 5-6 (C.M.A. 1987). 
4810 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).  Indecent language is language that is “grossly offensive to 
modesty, decency, or propriety, or shocks moral sensibilities because of its vulgar, filthy, or 
disgusting nature, or its tendencies to incite lustful thought.”  M.C.M. ¶ 89c. 
4910 U.S.C. § 917 (2000).  Provoking words or gestures are those that tend to provoke 
breaches of the peace.  M.C.M. ¶ 42. c.(1). 
5010 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).  Disorderly conduct is conduct of a nature to affect the peace 
and quiet of those who may witness it and be disturbed or provoked to resentment, including 
conduct that endangers public morals or outrages public decency.  M.C.M. ¶ 73 c. (2). 
5110 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).  Fraternization comprises the act(s) of a commissioned or 
warrant officer fraternizing on terms of military equality with an enlisted person when such 
fraternization violated the custom of the accused’s service that officers shall not fraternize 
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constitute assault, assault consummated by a battery,52 indecent assault, assault with 
the intent to commit rape or sodomy,53 rape,54 or sodomy,55 as well as cruelty and 
maltreatment and/or fraternization.  In addition, a court-martial could punish an 
accused under the so-called “general article” for conduct to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,56 or as 
conducting unbecoming an officer.57  Choosing among all of these potential offenses 
is not easy and often results in so-called “stacking” the charges—charging the 
accused with all that may apply and letting the court members sort it out.  Selecting 
the wrong charge or overcharging can certainly result in an improper verdict.58 
                                                          
with enlisted members on terms of military equality.  The explanation states that factors the 
court-martial should consider to determine whether the contact or association comprises an 
offense include whether the conduct has compromised the chain of command, resulted in an 
appearance of partiality, or otherwise undermined good order, discipline, authority, or morale.  
M.C.M. ¶ 84 c. (1).  Fraternization may also be prosecuted as a violation of Article 92, as 
violating a general order or regulation if the accused’s service has such a regulation 
prohibiting fraternization.  10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000), M.C.M. ¶ 16c. 
52These assaults are both prohibited by 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2000). 
5310 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).  Indecent assault is one done with the intent to gratify the lust or 
sexual desires of the accused.  See ¶ 63, M.C.M.  Assault with the intent to commit rape or 
sodomy requires a specific intent to commit such crimes. 
5410 U.S.C. § 920 (2000).  The maximum punishment for rape is death, confinement for 
life, a dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the 
lowest enlisted grade.  ¶ 46e, M.C.M.  Under current military law, the military recognizes that 
the necessary “by force and without consent,” ¶ 45b(1), M.C.M., may include “constructive 
force,” in which the victim’s consent is induced by the extraordinary power a military superior 
has over a subordinate.  E.g., United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432 (C.M.A. 1992).  See 
generally, Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 
19, 26-34 (1996). 
5510 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).  Sodomy consists of unnatural carnal copulation, defined as 
taking into one’s mouth or anus the sexual organ of another, placing another’s sexual organ in 
one’s mouth or anus, or to have carnal copulation in any opening of the body other than the 
sexual parts.  ¶51c, M.C.M. 
5610 U.S.C. §§ 133-134 (2000) criminalize conduct unbecoming an officer and conduct 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit on the armed forces, 
respectively.  Article 133 criminalizes “action or behavior in an official capacity which, in 
dishonoring or disgracing the person as an officer, severely compromises [his or her 
character], or action or behavior in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or 
disgracing the officer personally, seriously compromises the person’s standing as an officer.”  
¶ 59(c).(2)., M.C.M.  Article 134 applies to all ranks, and comprises offenses that are specified 
in the MANUAL, see supra notes 42, 45, and acts that are only criminal because they are 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting.  ¶ 60, M.C.M. 
5710 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). 
58See Krohne, supra note 34, at 329.  The author concludes: 
From these cases one can begin to understand how unpredictably sexual harassment is 
handled in the military courts.  The wide variety of charges illustrates the 
inconsistency of sexual harassment enforcement and punishment.  In addition, it is 
apparent that a body of consistent case law on sexual harassment has not been 
developed in the military courts. 
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When a convening authority refers a case to a court-martial, he or she personally 
selects the court-members, the military equivalent of civilian jurors.59  Although the 
U.C.M.J. provides guidance as to the criteria the convening authority must use to 
select court-members,60 as a practical matter the convening authority can get away 
with selecting pretty much anyone he or she wants.  If, for example, the convening 
authority selects all subordinate unit commanders rather than more junior staff types, 
he can easily justify it, if challenged by the defense, by saying that commanders are 
best qualified by virtue of age and experience to adjudge guilt or innocence and an 
appropriate sentence, if the accused is guilty.  However, senior commanders would 
be more likely to see things in the same way as the convening authority and decide 
the case as they believe the convening authority wants them to.  Another problem is 
the potential appointment of law enforcement officers.  Military appellate decisions 
often uphold the selection of law enforcement personnel who, presumably, have a 
bias toward convicting those they, or their subordinates, have investigated.61 
Further, although the U.C.M.J. prohibits reprisals, such as lowered efficiency 
reports, against court members for making decisions the convening authority 
dislikes,62 court members know that the commander can harm their career without 
taking an action severe enough to violate this prohibition, such as “damming [the 
court member] with faint praise.”  In today’s military, you don’t get promoted unless 
you “always exceed requirements,” should be “promoted ahead of contemporaries,” 
as opposed to “usually exceed requirements” and “promote with contemporaries.”  
Trying to prove that this faint, but career-killing praise is a reprisal for a court-
martial decision is problematical at best.  The high-ranking officer who wrote such a 
report just has to say that, no, the efficiency report was accurate because the officer 
in question always meets requirements and frequently, but does not always exceed 
them and thus should be promoted along with all of his or her contemporaries.63 
                                                          
Id. 
5910 U.S.C. § 825 (2000), details who may serve on courts-martial.  Any commissioned 
officer may serve on a court-martial.  § 825(a).  Warrant officers may serve on any court-
martial except those trying commissioned officers.  § 825(b).  If the accused requests enlisted 
members, they must comprise at least one-third of the court members and must not be from 
the same unit as the accused.  § 825(c). 
60Under 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2), the convening authority “shall detail as members thereof 
such members of the armed forces as, in his opinion, are best qualified for the duty by reason 
of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.” 
61E.g., United States v. Fulton, 44 M.J. 100 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (proper to deny challenge 
against chief of security police); United States v. McDavid, 37 M.J. 861 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993) 
(no per se exclusion of security police).  Cf. United States v. Berry, 34 M.V. 83 (C.M.A. 1992) 
(abuse of discretion to deny challenge against command duty investigator for base security 
who worked with key government witnesses). 
6210 U.S.C. § 837, titled “Unlawfully influencing action of court,” prohibits any 
convening authority or commanding officer from reprimanding any court member, military 
judge, or counsel with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court.  Nor may they 
evaluate the performance of duty of any court member in any fitness or efficiency report used 
to determine promotions, assignments, retention on active duty and the like. 
63See Michael Spak & Jonathan Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps? 28 S.W. U. 
L.REV. 481, n.262 and accompanying text. 
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Considering the presumption of regularity that the selection of court members 
enjoy,64 persuading a military judge to find that the convening authority selected 
tough senior commanders to hammer the accused would almost always be doomed to 
failure.  If, on the other hand, the convening authority selected such members 
because they would be unsympathetic to a lower ranking enlisted woman so as to 
protect a high-ranking harasser, his or her lawyer, the trial counsel (prosecutor) is 
hardly in a position to complain.  Thus, the victim’s claim will not result in a 
conviction and she will have no effective way to get redress.  Double jeopardy 
applies in the military as well as in civilian courts.65 
Even if the convening authority does not select court members that will reflect 
his or her view of good order and discipline, the alternative may be as bad or worse.  
Some convening authorities either don’t want their best officers, such as those 
selected to be commanders, taking time away from really important things, such as 
training for war, and will select court members who are more expendable—and often 
less qualified.66 
Potential court members that the convening authorities will not select are low-
ranking enlisted members.  Even when an enlisted accused requests enlisted court 
members, those court-members will come from the highest enlisted ranks—sergeant 
majors, master sergeants, and sergeants first class from the Army, master chief petty 
officers and chief petty officers, and similar high-ranking Marine and Air Force 
noncommissioned officers.67  These high-ranking enlisted members will share the 
same values as the high-ranking officers they work for—and may be even more 
conservative and less likely to believe a low-ranking female victim of sexual 
harassment by a high-ranking officer or noncommissioned officer.68 
Another problem with the convening authority’s control over courts-martial is 
that the official decides many pretrial motions.  Defense counsel must submit 
requests to produce witnesses to the trial counsel (prosecutor) who works for the 
convening authority.  If the trial counsel does not believe that the law requires their 
production, the defense may litigate the matter before the military judge.69  Requests 
for expert witnesses, however, must be made directly to the convening authority.  
Again refusal may be litigated before the military judge.70  Obviously, the lack of 
witnesses harms the truth finding process. 
                                                                
64E.g., United States v. Giles, 48 M.J. 454, 455-56 (C.A.A.F. 1998); United States v. 
White, 36 M.J. 284, 287 (C.M.A. 1993). 
65See R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C). 
66James Kevin Lovejoy, Abolition of Court Member Sentencing in the Military, 142 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 32 (1993). 
67In the authors’ experience with courts-martial, neither has ever seen a low-ranking 
enlisted person detailed to a court-martial as a member of the “jury.” 
68According to the NAVY PERSONNEL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, ASSESSMENT 
OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY:  RESULTS OF THE 1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY 4 (1992), 
females comprised 10% of the active duty personnel of the Navy.  Most of these women are in 
the lower enlisted ranks.  Id. 
69R.C.M. 703(c)(2). 
70R.C.M. 703(d). 
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Convening authorities also decide whether to grant immunity to witnesses71 and 
whether to enter into plea bargains.72  Because the military may view the victim of 
sexual harassment as a suspect, as in a case in which a regulation bans dating 
between a trainee and a drill instructor, a refusal to grant immunity to the victim may 
result in the greater offender—the one who abused his higher rank and position 
going free.  And, because of the way convening authorities grant immunity, coupled 
with an order to testify, significant potential exists for an alleged victim of 
fraternization to either lie or exaggerate the culpability of the higher ranking 
servicemember on trial.  Although the order to testify is usually couched in terms of 
testifying “truthfully,” it is the trial counsel who will decide whether or not the 
testimony is truthful.  Often the immunity and order to testify are coupled with the 
preferral of court-martial charges against the less-culpable, lower ranking female 
servicemember and a discharge in lieu of court-martial if she testifies “truthfully” 
against the higher ranking defendant.  This puts an alleged victim who either 
fabricated a sexual harassment complaint or exaggerated it in the unenviable position 
of having to testify so as to perpetuate the lie or the exaggeration to avoid trial 
herself—again hardly conducive to arriving at the truth. 
In a recent trial in which one of the authors was involved, for example, the 
alleged victim of fraternization told Army criminal investigators some 50 times that 
she did not have sex with the accused, a sergeant at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks 
(DB) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  She had admitted to sexual relations with other 
DB guards.  After being charged with fraternization and other offenses herself, the 
convening authority immunized her and ordered her to take a polygraph 
examination.  The polygraph examiner told her she had flunked, which caused her to 
change her story to implicate the accused, relating that she and the accused had 
sexual relations on May 16th.  The military judge denied a defense request for 
production of the polygraph report and charts to determine whether she had, in fact, 
shown deception or, as the defense believed, was lied to in order to get her to 
implicate the accused.  The day before the trial actually started and after the trial 
counsel prepared her to testify after receiving notice of the defense alibi for May 
16th, she changed her testimony to stating that the sexual encounter occurred the 
preceding night, May 15th.  She testified at trial that she would lose her discharge in 
lieu of court-martial if she did not testify “truthfully” against the accused.  Further, 
she was ignorant of certain physical aspects of the accused which were so 
remarkable that she would have noted if they had actually engaged in sexual 
relations.  The court members deliberated three hours before acquitting the accused, 
who had to face a general court-martial, a dishonorable discharge, and in excess of 
                                                                
71R.C.M. 704(c). 
72R.C.M. 704.  The military pretrial agreement, what civilians would call a “plea bargain,” 
differs from civilian practice in that it places a ceiling on the punishment.  If the court-martial 
imposes a lesser punishment, the accused gets the benefit of that lesser punishment and the 
pretrial agreement was nothing more than an insurance policy.  If, however, the court-martial 
sentences the accused to a more severe punishment, the convening authority must reduce the 
sentence to that specified in the plea agreement.  See generally, Francis A. Gilligan & Michael 
D. Wims, Civilian Justice v. Military Justice: In Many Instances, Service Members Accused of 
Crime Are Granted More Rights Than Civilians, 5 SUM. CRIM. JUST. 2, 37 (Summer, 1990).  
For a contrary view comparing military and civilian justice, see the authors’ article, supra note 
1. 
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ten years’ confinement based on such an unreliable witness.73  While this case 
involved an innocent accused, it nonetheless demonstrates the unreliability of a 
witness who was induced to testify by the convening authority’s powers to enter into 
plea bargains and grant immunity—again powers reserved to lawyers in the civilian 
system.  And failure to exercise such powers could also harm the truth-finding 
process and either result in the conviction of an innocent party or the rejection of a 
valid claim of sexual harassment.74 
The final problem with command control over courts-martial is the problem of 
illegal command influence.  While much command control is not illegal, such as the 
power to select court members,75 convening authorities and other commanders who 
go too far in controlling courts-martial may violate Article 37, U.C.M.J., which 
                                                                
73See Connie Parish, Sergeant Acquitted in USDB Court-Martial, THE LEAVENWORTH 
TIMES, March 5, 1999, at 1. 
74The Tenth Circuit’s recent Singleton case, which sent shock waves through federal 
prosecutors before the Tenth Circuit on rehearing en banc reversed the decision, illustrates the 
unreliability of testimony induced by a promise of leniency.  United States v. Singleton, 144 
F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 
S.Ct. 2371 (1999).  In the original opinion, the 10th Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), 
which prohibits unlawful inducements to a witness applied to a U.S. attorney’s promise to file 
a motion for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines if a witness testified 
truthfully and not to prosecute him for any other drug offenses against the defendant.  Section 
201(c)(2) reads: 
Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value to any 
person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given 
by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court 
. . . authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony . . . 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. 
In finding that the statute applied to government agents, the court cited United States v. 
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988) 
(“[i]t is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced 
sentence . . . .”); United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984) (witness “admitted lying in over thirty different statements 
motivated by his sense of self-preservation” under plea arrangement requiring his testimony in 
return for a lenient sentence.)  In support of the proposition that an obvious purpose of § 201 
was to keep testimony free of influence to protect its truthfulness.  The en banc opinion, 
however, held that § 201(c)(2) did not apply to the United States acting in its sovereign 
capacity.  That holding would not, however, appear to deny the danger to the fact-finding 
process inherent in promising leniency to a defendant in return for “truthful” testimony.  And 
these dangers may be greater in the military context than in the civilian federal context 
because of the command control of the convening authority. 
75See supra  nn. 55-60 and accompanying text.  The lawful participation of the commander 
in the system is one of the dominant features of the military justice system.  Teresa K. 
Hollingsworth, Unlawful Command Influence, 39 A.F. L. REV. 261 (1996), citing DAVID A. 
SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 255 (1992).  When, 
however, commanders and convening authorities try to influence decisions that should be 
independent of command and convening authority prerogatives, it becomes “illegal” or 
“unlawful” command influence as prohibited by 10 U.S.C. § 837.  Id.  Nor is illegal command 
influence limited to commanders and convening authorities.  Military appellate courts have 
applied Article 37 to staff officers, noncommissioned officers, and military judges.  Id. 
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prohibits illegal command influence.76  Notwithstanding this prohibition, military 
officials have continued to attempt to influence courts-martial results improperly.  
Among recent such attempts are: 
• Issuing policy statements that castigate a certain class of offenders, state that 
they should be removed from the military, or discourage witnesses from 
testifying for the defense. 
• Making speeches that stress the above points to audiences which include 
potential witnesses and court-members. 
• Publicly humiliating the accused, as by stripping them of unit insignia in a 
public military formation, thereby stripping the accused of the presumption 
of innocence and biasing potential court members and witnesses. 
• Witness tampering, consisting of intimidating witnesses to prevent them 
from testifying or punishing those that do.77 
 
While such actions have great potential to prejudice the case, military appellate 
courts have developed such a high standard for prevailing on an illegal command 
influence claim that the accused seldom gets meaningful, if any, relief.78  Further, 
finding evidence of illegal command influence is problematic, at best.  Those who 
were illegally influenced or witnesses thereto may be reluctant to risk their careers 
by informing on their superiors.  Further, military defense counsel may not want to 
accuse these commanders or others who may sit on the lawyer’s future promotion 
                                                                
7610 U.S.C. § 837(a) reads: 
(a) No authority convening a . . . court-martial, nor any other commanding officer, 
may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or 
counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with 
respect to any other exercises of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceeding.  
No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized 
means, influence the action of a court-martial . . . or any member thereof, in reaching 
the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or 
reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts.  The foregoing provisions of the 
subsection shall not apply with respect to (1) general instructional or informational 
courses in military justice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of 
instructing members of a command in the substantive or procedural aspects of courts-
martial, or (2) to statements and instructions given in open court by the military judge, 
president of a special court-martial, or counsel. 
Section (b) of Article 37 prohibits any person subject to the U.C.M.J. from evaluating the 
performance of any member of a court-martial in the preparation of a fitness or similar report 
or from giving a less favorable rating to counsel for the accused because of the zeal with 
which counsel represented the accused. 
77Deana M.C. Willis, The Road to Hell is Paved With Good Intentions: Finding and 
Fixing Unlawful Command Influence, 1992-AUG ARMY LAW. 3, 6-12 (1992). 
78Under the so-called Ayala/Strombaugh test, the defense must first demonstrate that the 
alleged source of illegal command influence acted with the mantle of command authority.  
United States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208 (C.M.A. 1994).  Ayala places the burden on the 
defense to produce sufficient evidence to raise the issue and permits the court to decide that 
the evidence of the alleged illegal command influence was not strong enough nor prejudicial 
enough to grant relief.  United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296 (C.A.A.F. 1995).  See Lawrence J. 
Morris, This Better Be Good: The Courts Continue to Tighten the Burden in Unlawful 
Command Influence Cases, 1998-May ARMY LAW 49 (1988). 
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boards, of illegal command influence.79  And, alleging illegal command influence is 
not likely to improve one’s chances for a favorable pretrial agreement (plea bargain) 
or for clemency if the court-martial imposes a harsh sentence.80 
While the requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a court-martial 
which can impose criminal sanctions81 is appropriate, this high burden of proof may 
result in perpetrators of sexual harassment “getting off,” thus, failing to vindicate 
actual victims of such harassment.  While only Sergeant Major of the Army Gene 
McKinney and the six women he was accused of sexually harassing82 will ever know 
what, if anything, really happened, commentators have postulated that the heavy 
                                                                
79Perhaps the most egregious example of a defense counsel being “punished” for raising 
illegal command influence resulted in a Congressional inquiry.  An Army lawyer who raised 
an illegal command influence issue for one of his appellate clients after his supervising 
attorney, a full colonel, told him not to was nonselected for promotion to lieutenant colonel 
when his supervisor later sat on the promotion board.  The Army Board for Correction of 
Military Records found that the colonel should not have sat on the promotion board and 
ordered the promotion to lieutenant colonel.  As a result of the Congressional inquiry, the 
Acting Judge Advocate General of the Army was not confirmed as Judge Advocate General 
and retired.  A nomination to the grade of brigadier general also failed and the President 
withdrew two other nomination for brigadier general.  One of these withdrawn nominations 
for brigadier general was for the colonel who “punished the defense counsel and later sat on 
the counsel’s promotion board.  SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATION OF ISSUES CONCERNING NOMINATIONS FOR GENERAL OFFICER POSITIONS IN THE 
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, U.S. ARMY, S. Rep. No. 102-1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1991). 
80Under R.C.M. 705, a convening authority may enter into a plea bargain, known as a 
“pretrial agreement,” with the accused.  In cases in which the court-martial adjudges a more 
severe sentence than that called for in the pretrial agreement, the convening authority must 
then reduce the sentence to that called for in the agreement.  If the court-martial adjudges a 
less severe sentence, then the accused has “beat the deal,” and gets the lesser sentence, 
relegating the plea bargain to the status of unused insurance against a more severe sentence.  
See generally, Gilligan & Wims, supra note 72 at 37.  In any case, whether a pretrial 
agreement exists or not, the convening authority may grant clemency by disapproving the 
entire sentence or any part thereof.  R.C.M. 1107(d) specifies that the convening authority may 
for any or no reason disapprove the sentence in whole or in part, mitigate the sentence, or 
change a punishment to one of a different nature as long as doing so does not increase the 
severity of the punishment.  For example, the convening authority could change six months’ 
confinement to, say, two months restriction, but could not change such a period of restriction 
to confinement.  In the authors’ experience, the granting of clemency by convening authorities 
is very rare.  More often, they want to, but cannot, increase the sentence. 
81Under R.C.M. 920(e), the military judge must instruct the court members that “[t]he 
accused must be presumed to be innocent until the accused’s guilt is established by legal and 
competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt.” 
82SGM McKinney was accused of pressuring female subordinates for sex, forced kissing, 
and boasting of his sexual prowess to the six women and one sexual encounter.  See Stephen 
Komarow, Army Sex Scandal Reaches Higher Service’s Top Enlisted Man Faces Charges, 
USA TODAY, May 8, 1997, at 3A; Jane Gross, Former Top Sergeant of Army Is Acquitted of 
All Sex Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at A1.  The court-martial did, however, convict 
him of one obstruction of justice offense for attempting to coach the testimony of one of his 
accusers.  He was demoted one grade and reprimanded.  Jane Gross, Sergeant Major Gets 
One-Step Demotion But No Time in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A1. 
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burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt83 or the so-called “good soldier” defense 
led to the acquittal.  Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) is an exception to the 
general rule that evidence of a person’s character or a trait, thereof, is inadmissible to 
prove that the person acted in conformity with that character or trait on a particular 
occasion.  Rule 404(a)(1) permits introduction of a “pertinent character trait.84  In the 
military, general good military character qualifies as such, as do as other pertinent 
character traits.85  The theory is simple—good soldiers don’t commit crimes.86  
Because servicemembers receive periodic performance evaluations and often 
commendations and decorations for duty performance, adducing evidence of good 
military character is seldom difficult.87  In the case of a high-ranking officer or non-
commissioned officer, like Sergeant Major McKinney, such evidence can be 
overwhelming.  To be selected to be the highest-ranking enlisted member of one’s 
service, one’s record has to be beyond stellar. 
Thus, to convict a high-ranking officer or non-commissioned officer of sexual 
harassment, the high-ranking court-members must believe the lower-ranking 
complainant, whose credibility cannot be bolstered by evidence of good military 
character,88 against the higher-ranking accused, who can adduce evidence of his good 
(or overwhelmingly good) military character.89  And unless the lower-ranking 
                                                                
83Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A24. 
84M.R.E. 404(a)(1) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1).  See generally, 
Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Note, The Good Soldier Defense and Military Rank at Courts-
Martial, 108 YALE L.J. 879 (1999). 
85For example, an accused’s character for truthfulness would be relevant in a prosecution 
for making a false official statement.  STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, LEE D. SCHINASI, DAVID A. 
SCHELUETER, MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 366 (1981, 1986). 
86E.g., United States v. Vandelinder, 20 M.J. 41 (C.M.A. 1985)(evidence of good military 
character should have been admitted at trial for drug offenses because one with good military 
character is less likely to commit offenses which strike at the heart of military discipline and 
readiness). 
87Captain Andrea, Expanding the Good Soldier Defense: Use of Character Evidence as a 
Defense at Trial, 1993-Dec. ARMY LAW. 30 (1993). 
88Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2) only permits evidence of a pertinent trait or 
character of the victim of a crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide or an 
assault case to rebut evidence that the victim was the aggressor.  The Federal counterpart only 
allows such use in homicide cases.  F.R.E. 404(a)(2).  Under M.R.E. 404(a)(2), the accused 
can use this section to attempt to prove that the victim of an assault or homicide has character 
traits which tend to prove that the victim may have been responsible for the crime.  Good 
military character would hardly prove that the victim was responsible for the crime.  Under 
M.R.E. 608(a) allows an attack on the credibility of a witness or the rehabilitation of the 
witness, subject to two limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness and (2) such evidence is only admissible after the character of 
the witness for truthfulness has been attacked.  Again, general good military character would 
not qualify. 
89Aside from the authors’ experience, see Hillman, supra note 84, at 906-09 and n. 144 
(citing interviews with practitioners of military law). 
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complainant has a lot of corroborating evidence, it is not difficult to guess which one 
a court-martial is likely to believe.90 
Another possible reason for aberrant decisions by court-martial is the potentially 
small size of the jury panel and the two-thirds majority required for conviction.  
Unlike federal and state criminal trials, which must have larger juries,91 a military 
jury need only consist of five members for a general court-martial and three for a 
special court-martial.92  Ballew v. Georgia93 found a five member jury to be 
unconstitutional because the quality of justice in group deliberations decreases as the 
size of the group decreases and the quality of justice of a jury of fewer than six is 
unacceptable.  Ballew has not been extended to trials by court-martial, however,94 
leaving convening authorities free to detail as few as five members to general court-
                                                                
90See, e.g., J. Lancaster, In Military Harassment Cases, His Word Outranks Hers, Wash. 
Post, Nov. 15, 1992, at A1; Editorial, McKinney Case Showcases Military Law’s 
Shortcomings, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1998, at 14A; All Things Considered: Fort Hood 
Reactions, (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 16, 1998) (quoting Army officer who stated, “the 
outcome of the Gene McKinney case proves what [a female servicemember]’s already known 
. . . the more a superior has on his collar, the more he’ll get away with.”).  Although officers 
and noncommissioned officers do not always wear their rank on their collars, the meaning is 
plain. 
91Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-person jury is sufficient in all but capital 
cases; referring to the federal twelve-member jury as a historical accident, unnecessary to 
effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance); Johnson v. Louisiana, 
399 U.S. 356 (1972) (nine-to-three vote for conviction upheld); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 
401 (1972) (ten-to-two vote for conviction upheld).  Cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 411 U.S. 130 
(1979) (five-of-six verdict unconstitutional, noting that only two states allowed non-
unanimous verdicts by six-person juries); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (trial by 
five member jury unconstitutional).  A general courts-martial may try persons subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.), see 10 U.S.C. § 802, for any offense punishable 
under the U.C.M.J., see Articles 77-134, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934, and may adjudge 
any lawful punishment, including death when authorized by the U.C.M.J.  10 U.S.C. § 818.  A 
special courts-martial may try persons subject to the U.C.M.J. for noncapital offenses and may 
adjudge any punishment not forbidden under the U.C.M.J. except death, dishonorable 
discharge, dismissal, confinement for more than six months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-
thirds pay per month or forfeiture of pay for more than six months.  10 U.S.C. § 819. 
9210 U.S.C. § 829(b). 
93435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
94In U.S. v. Curtis, 32 M.J. 252 (C.M.A. 1990), the Court of Military Appeals found, in a 
capital case, that the capital procedure promulgated by the President was not facially 
unconstitutional despite the accused’s assertion that the rule did not prescribe such cases to be 
decided by at least 12 members.  Cf. U.S. v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592 (A.F.C.C.A. 1993) in which 
Judge Morgan’s concurrence found trial defense counsel’s successful efforts to reduce the size 
of the court-martial panel to be deficient, but not so deficient as to warrant relief despite the 
following language:  
I cannot conceive, therefore, of any single thing appellant’s defense counsel could 
have done more damaging to appellant’s chances to escape the death penalty than to 
abet the diminution of his court-martial panel.  Certainly, this blunder exceeds by an 
order of magnitude any errors in choosing not to present more of appellant’s 
psychosocial history. 
Id. at 627. 
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martial.  Further, only two-thirds are required to convict.95  If the prosecution does 
not convince two-thirds of the court members on the first ballot, the accused is 
acquitted.96  Thus, a “hung jury” is not possible on the question of guilt or innocence 
in a court-martial.  But taken with the small size of the jury, making such a 
determination on but one ballot, which may thereby severely cut down discussion, 
this voting requirement has great potential for erroneous decisions—especially with 
biased court members or an accused with great character evidence.97 
Finally, even the U.S. Supreme Court has opined that “courts-martial as an 
institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional 
law”98 and certainly were not designed to protect servicemembers from 
discrimination.99  Courts-martial are purely criminal tribunals and are only 
empowered to determine guilt or innocence and impose a sentence on a guilty 
accused.100  While the military judge may decide whether military law enforcement 
authorities coerced a conviction or conducted an illegal search, military judges and 
court members have no particular competence in deciding sexual harassment claims, 
even if they had jurisdiction to consider anything other than whether the accused is 
guilty of some offense under the U.C.M.J.  Thus, even if a court-martial believes a 
sexual harassment complaintant, and convicts the accused, the victim’s only 
compensation will be the knowledge that her complaint was vindicated and her 
harasser punished. 
                                                                
9510 U.S.C. § 852(2). 
96R.C.M. 921(a). 
97In a case in which one of the authors was military defense counsel—the accused, a drill 
sergeant, was accused of hitting a trainee—the small court-martial panel acquitted in less than 
two minutes after the defense put the accused on the stand to testify that he had hit the trainee.  
He further testified that he had been provoked and intimated that the court members would 
have done the same thing.  The defense also adduced good military character evidence.  
Regardless of whether this was the correct result, two minutes did not leave much time for 
discussion and deliberation. 
98O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (holding that off-post offenses must be 
“service-connected” for the military to exercise jurisdiction over them), overruled by Solorio 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
99O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265. 
100Col. William Winthrop’s explanation of the criminal nature of courts-martial is as true 
today as it was in 1920: 
[T]he court-martial is strictly a criminal court.  It has in fact no civil jurisdiction 
whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an 
individual. . . .  Even where it tries and convicts an accused for an offense involved in 
an obligation incurred or injury done to another person, . . . it cannot adjudge that the 
debt be paid, that the property be returned, or that its pecuniary value or the amount of 
the damage, be made good to the party aggrieved.  Its judgment is a criminal sentence, 
not a civil verdict:  its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment 
of guilt. 
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49-50 (2d ed. 1920).  For a more 
current view, consider William Westmoreland, Military Justice—A Commander's Viewpoint, 
10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 8 (1971).  “[I]t seems too clear for argument that courts-martial are 
criminal courts, possessing penal jurisdiction exclusively and performing a strictly judicial 
function in enforcing a penal code and applying highly punitive sanctions.”  Id. 
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If, as it appears, the court-martial is the wrong system and has the wrong fact-
finder to determine the validity of sexual harassment complaints and, if it is a decent 
system, it cannot award damages, what avenue of redress is preferable? 
IV.  A FEDERAL (NON-MILITARY) REMEDY FOR MILITARY SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
CLAIMS? 
A military victim of sexual harassment may not suffer employment related 
losses, such as lost wages, because military law would not excuse a harassment 
victim who went absent without leave (AWOL) because of the harassment—the 
military version of a constructive discharge.101  In United States v. Sutek,102 the Navy-
Marine Court of Military Review overturned the AWOL conviction of Seaman 
Susan Sutek finding that her fear of an impending shipboard initiation which had 
elements of sexual harassment was sufficient to excuse her absence because of 
duress.103  However, in United States v. Biscoe,104 the Court of Appeals of the Armed 
Forces upheld the guilty plea of a female officer who contended on appeal that the 
military judge had not made sufficient inquiry into her possible defense of duress 
based on sexual harassment.  The court focused on her lack of fear of serious bodily 
injury—a fear that the Navy-Marine Court had found present in Seaman’s Sutek’s 
case.  Thus, it appears that a servicemember cannot be “constructively discharged” 
from the military because of sexual harassment unless that harassment puts her in 
reasonable fear of serious bodily injury. 
Of course, many times the military ends up discharging the victim of the 
harassment.  She may have violated the same regulations against fraternization that 
the accused did, although she would clearly be less culpable.  Or, the higher ranking 
harasser may, upon suspecting that his improper actions may become known, begin 
his defense by discrediting the victim—by documenting her poor duty performance 
and so on.  In a society where arriving to work five minutes late is a criminal 
offense,105 any supervisor can easily document “poor” duty performance by 
counseling statements, reprimands, poor efficiency reports, as well as by punitive 
measures such as nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial.  Low-ranking victims 
may find themselves facing charges, receiving a grant of immunity and an 
                                                                
101Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993).  A constructive 
discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working condition so 
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.  Id. 
102United States v. Roberts and Sutek, 14 M.J. 671 (N.M.C.M.R.1982), rev'd. (as to 
Roberts), 15 M.J. 106 (C.M.A.1983).  As to Seaman Ronald Roberts, the husband of Seaman 
Sutek, the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review only approved a sentence of no-
punishment.  The Court of Military Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision as to Seaman 
Roberts, reinstating his adjudged punishment.  Id. 
103Paragraph 216g of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL specifies that an accused is 
excused for criminal responsibility under the defense of duress if she had a reasonably 
grounded fear of the receipt of serious bodily injury. 
10447 M.J. 398 (C.A.A.F. 1998). 
105M.C.M. & 10e(1).  Failing to go to, or going from, one’s appointed place of duty is a 
violation of 10 U.S.C. § 836, punishable by confinement for one month and forfeiture of two-
thirds pay for one month.  Id. 
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administrative discharge in return for testifying “truthfully” against the accused.106  
Because the harassment victims usually want out of the military by this point, they 
will accede to this procedure even when it results in a less-than-fully-honorable 
discharge and the corresponding loss of military and veteran’s benefits.107  Of course 
other victims may continue to serve in the military. 
Any military sexual harassment victim, however, may suffer other damages that 
sexual harassment law recognizes, such as intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, pain and suffering, invasion of privacy, and the like.108  Is there any avenue 
of redress for such injuries in the military? 
As for administrative remedies within the military, only three exist and none of 
them has the power to afford much relief.  First, a victim of sexual harassment may 
file an Article 138 complaint with her commander.109  If the commander denies 
redress, the complaint is forwarded up the chain of command to the officer 
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction.  The convening authority conducts an 
inquiry, grants or denies the relief, and sends a report to the service secretary.110  But, 
as discussed above,111 commanders loathe to find sexual harassment in their 
commands and short of transferring or disciplining the alleged offender, have little 
ability to compensate the victim.  An article in the Southern California Review of 
Law and Women’s Studies pointed out flaws in using Article 138 to correct sexual 
harassment problems: 
Although Article 138 does give service people an avenue for redress, it 
is not adequate for sexual harassment purposes because . . . it requires the 
servicemember to go through the chain of command for relief.  Recent 
events surrounding the Tailhook scandal and the responses of both the 
female service-members who were assaulted and their superiors display 
this weakness with the Article.  When a Navy Lieutenant helicopter pilot 
filed a complaint with her boss, he replied, “That’s what you get for going 
to a hotel party with a bunch of drunk aviators.”  Another problem with 
Article 138 is that it applies only to wrongs committed by a commanding 
officer upon a subordinate.  The provision will not extend to sexual 
harassment between fellow enlisted personnel or to harassment which is 
visited upon a commander by a subordinate.  Furthermore, depending on 
                                                                
106See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
107JONATHAN P. TOMES, SERVICEMEMBER’S LEGAL GUIDE 40-47 (3d ed. 1996).  Less than 
fully “honorable” discharges include “general” discharges, which are under honorable 
conditions and entitle the recipient thereof to military and veteran’s benefits and “other-than-
honorable” discharges which generally do not result in the receipt of such benefits.  Only a 
court-martial may adjudge “punitive” discharges—bad conduct and dishonorable discharges 
which result in the loss of all benefits.  The officer version of a punitive discharge is a 
“dismissal.”  Id. 
108Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, HANDLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES § 28 (1993). 
10910 U.S.C. § 938. 
110Id. 
111See Chamallas, supra note 14, at 308, and accompanying text; O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 
265. 
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which service the victim is in, she may not even have the right to a 
military attorney.112   
Second, a servicemember can obtain review of his or her discharge from his or 
her service’s discharge review board.  Such a board can change an unfavorable 
discharge to a more favorable one but it cannot revoke the discharge.  Nor can it 
award damages for improper discharge or anything else.113  Finally, boards of 
correction of military or naval records may correct such records to correct an error or 
remove an injustice.114  While such a correction could result in the award of back pay 
for an improper discharge or reinstatement, these boards cannot award other 
damages.115  Further, to get relief, one must have an incorrect record to correct.  In 
Saal v. Middendorf,116 the court noted that by issuing an honorable discharge, the 
Navy “effectively precluded review . . . by the Board for Correction of Naval 
Records for there [was] no record left to correct.”117  Nor does the board conduct an 
independent investigation118 or have the authority to strike down military policy and 
it probably lacks the competence to decide constitutional issues.119  As one 
commentator noted: 
[The Board of Corrections] is an inadequate means to redress sexual 
harassment complaints because it offers no aid unless a victim has a 
negative comment on her record as a function of, or in retaliation for, 
complaining about sexual harassment.  Sexual harassment is rarely 
manifested by recorded admonishments.  Moreover, “injustice” is not 
defined, service-members have no right to a hearing, and complainants 
rarely know when they have exhausted intramilitary remedies and earned 
                                                                
112Murray, supra note 21, at 290-91. 
11310 U.S.C. § 1553.  See David S. Franke, Administrative Separation from the Military: A 
Due Process Analysis, 1990-OCT ARMY LAW. 11, 19 (1990). 
11410 U.S.C. § 1552. 
115See Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980) (inadequacy of a remedy 
available from the Army Board for Correction of Military Records, which lacks authority to 
award damages, is outweighed by considerations of efficiency and agency expertise 
underlying the exhaustion requirement and by the availability of other remedies such as 
reinstatement and payment of backpay). 
116427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, Beller v. Middendorf, 632 
F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981). 
117427 F. Supp. at 197. 
118See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(e). 
119See Walmer v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 835 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Kan. 1993), aff’d 
52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 974 (1995) (servicemember pending 
discharge for homosexual conduct was not required to appeal her discharge to the Army Board 
for Correction of Military Records before asserting the unconstitutionality of the regulations 
under which she was discharged in federal court because the ABCMR has no power to strike 
down military policy and constitutional issues which are inappropriate for decision by an 
administrative body). 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
358 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:335 
the right to appeal to a civilian court.  Furthermore, civilian courts usually 
defer to the BCMR’s decisions.120 
If, as it appears, the military intra-service remedies cannot afford relief to a 
victim of sexual harassment, what about the federal courts?  At present, sexual 
harassment victims have no greater chance for redress in the federal courts than in 
the military system because of the so-called Feres doctrine and because Title VII 
does not apply to the military. 
Fifty years ago, in Feres v. United States,121 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
servicemembers could not sue the military for monetary damages.  Feres involved 
lawsuits brought by three active duty servicemembers who were victims of 
negligence by military personnel acting within the scope of their employment under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).122  The Court focused on three rationale for its 
decision.  First, the FTCA did not create an action by servicemembers against their 
military superiors or the government itself because the FTCA created no new causes 
of action and because no American cause of action ever allowed a servicemember to 
recover damages from their military superiors.123  Second, because the FTCA bases 
liability on the law of the state where the act or omission occurred and because 
servicemembers have no control over their assignments, it would be nonsensical to 
base liability on the law of the state of the forum.124  Finally, because 
servicemembers have a generous statutory scheme of military and veteran’s benefits, 
Congress must not have intended to give them an additional remedy under the 
FTCA.125  Thus, servicemembers cannot maintain a suit if the injury is “incident to 
service.” 
Notwithstanding almost universal scholarly criticism of the decision,126 the 
Supreme Court has continued to affirm Feres.  For example, in Chappell v. 
                                                                
120Murray, supra note 21, at 286-87. 
121340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
12228 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.  The FTCA waived sovereign immunity for certain torts 
committed by employees of the United States.  The relevant portion reads: 
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred. 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
123Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42. 
124Id. at 143.  
125Id. at 140. 
126See, e.g., Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley:  Three Strikes and 
Servicemembers are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 (1990); Barry Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, 
Discipline and the Weapons of War, 29 St. Louis U. L.J. 383 (1984); David E. Seidelson, The 
Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act:  New Insights Into an Old Problem, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1983); Donald N. Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service 
Meets Constitutional Tort, 60 N.C.L. REV. 489 (1982); Robert Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine 
After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24 (1976). 
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Wallace,127 the Court extended Feres to constitutional torts committed by the 
military, holding that servicemembers could not recover monetary damages for such 
wrongs.128  Unites States v. Stanley,129 affirmed Chappell, noting that the courts 
should not allow lawsuits that would call into question decision-making: 
Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which 
would becloud military decision-making), the mere process of arriving at 
correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime.  The “incident to 
service” test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that 
can be discerned with less extensive inquiry into military matters.130 
Obviously, many sexual harassment cases could involve extensive inquiry into 
military matters.  However, the disruption to the “military regime” by allowing such 
lawsuits would hardly seem greater than the disruption caused by the Navy’s 
investigation into Tailhook, the Sergeant-Major McKinney case, or the Aberdeen 
Proving Ground trainee sexual harassment cases.131 
                                                                
127462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
128Chappell involved claims of racial discrimination.  Although the Supreme Court’s 
earlier decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 
authorized suits for damages against federal officials who had violated the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights, the Chappell Court held that the Bivens limitation on such remedies when 
“special factors counseling hesitation” are present, applied to suits by military members 
against their superiors, thereby foreclosing relief.  Id. at 396.  The Court focused on the unique 
disciplinary structure of the military and Congress’ activity in the field.  462 U.S. at 304.  The 
Court did note that injunctive relief or other forms of relief not involving damage awards 
remained available.  Id. 
129483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
130Id. at 682. 
131At the 1991 Tailhook convention, junior Navy officers assaulted approximately 83 
women.  As to the effect of the investigation, one commentator noted: 
After allegations surfaced of junior Naval officers’ assaults on women at the Tailhook 
convention, the Navy’s attempts to police itself revealed a disturbing pattern of 
outright sexism and corruption.  The executive branch during the Bush Administration 
was also angered by the Inspector General’s inability to investigate the allegations 
successfully.  The Inspector General and the Naval Investigative Service Command 
began preliminary investigations more than a month after the incident and concluded 
them only seven months later.  After more than 1,500 interviews with officers and 
civilians who had been present at the convention, “investigators were able to identify 
only two suspects because of officers’ refusals to talk about the incidents.”  The 
Inspector General’s report also revealed that certain commanding officers refused to 
order their subordinates to be photographed so that victims would not be able to 
identify their assailants.  . . .  
 
As the investigation progressed, scandal heaped upon scandal.  H. Lawrence Garrett 
III, the Secretary of the Navy and the head of the Tailhook investigation, asked the 
Pentagon to take over the investigation when reports surfaced that he was present at 
the festivities and that fifty-five pages of documents that revealed his presence were 
deleted from the official reports. . . . Using lie detectors, undercover agents, and 
detailed computer analyses to dismantle the “wall of silence” that hampered earlier 
investigations, the Inspector General found that even more women than suspected had 
been assaulted and identified 175 naval officers for possible disciplinary action. . . . 
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Nor is there any real evidence that barring servicemembers from suing harms 
discipline.  Feres and its progeny has not stopped servicemembers’ suits.  Rather, it 
has made it next-to-impossible for them to win.  Servicemembers have still brought 
uncounted cases against their superiors and the military.132  Nor does Feres and its 
progeny factor in the costs of not affording servicemembers a remedy for sexual 
harassment and other forms of discrimination.133  Further, everyone other than 
servicemembers can sue the military for negligence and constitutional torts 
regardless of any alleged harm to the military from such litigation.134  And many of 
those suits involve federal civilian employees of the Armed Forces suing for sexual 
harassment.135  Nonetheless, Congress would have to legislatively overturn Feres for 
servicemembers to be able to maintain sexual harassment actions in the courts. 
                                                          
Murray, supra note 21, at 282-83.  Of all these suspects, none were convicted by court-martial 
and only fifty were disciplined at all by fines, reprimands, and the like.  Id. at 283-84. 
In the Aberdeen Proving Ground case, female trainees accused drill sergeants of sexual 
harassment.  The investigation into the allegations uncovered out-of-control sexual 
misconduct.  “A parade of former trainees, all women, . . . testified that drill sergeants and 
trainees alike routinely initiated consensual sexual relations, a violation of military law.”  
Elaine Sciolino, Rape Witnesses Tell of Base Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at 
A8.  These witnesses testified about the freewheeling, libidinous atmosphere in which sexual 
activity between superiors and subordinates was rampant and drill sergeants competed to have 
sex with as many trainees as they could.  Id. at A12. 
How, then, could the disruption caused by federal court litigation of a sexual harassment 
complaint be any more disruptive to the “military regime?” 
132See Rhodes, supra note 126, at 42: 
[T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by service members over the past 
twenty-five years has degraded the military mission. 
The modern soldier has also been litigious in other areas.  Although this litigation has 
not been particularly productive for the plaintiffs, service members have vigorously 
asserted their positions in direct court action against high-ranking officials.  The 
proliferation of this constitutional litigation apparently has not interfered with military 
operations. 
133Uncorrected sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination can certainly harm 
morale, unit cohesion, and even the ability to fight.  Discrimination against black soldiers in 
Vietnam resulted in racial violence and impaired combat efficiency.  De Nike, The New 
“Problem Soldier”—Dissenter in the Ranks, 49 IND. L.J. 685, 687-89 (1974) (asserting that 
racial violence was prompted by underlying resentment by blacks of unequal treatment); D. 
CORTWRIGHT, SOLDIERS IN REVOLT 41 (1975) (recounting black soldier’s refusal to go into the 
field).  See also id. at 56, 140, 154-55, 210, 218-19 (recounting disobedience of orders and 
threats to readiness inherent in response to discrimination).  Author Tomes’s personal 
experience as an infantry platoon leader in Vietnam confirms the above points. 
134See Tomes, supra note 126, at 111. 
135E.g., Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (District court improperly 
invaded the province of the jury in granting summary judgment for Navy in sexual harassment 
action by former employee); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 1999) (Department of 
Defense was not vicariously liable for supervisor’s harassment because of functioning 
antiharassment policy and prompt and effective action taken against harassing behavior); 
Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (employee was entitled 
to jury trial and compensatory damages for harassment occurring after effective date of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991); Bailey v. West, 941 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Kan. 1996) (Army employee 
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In addition to the overall Feres bar, the F.T.C.A. itself bars intentional torts, 
whether based on assault or for negligence that resulted in the intentional tort.136  
Thus, Congress would have to amend this section involving intentional torts to 
permit victims of sexual harassment to obtain relief under the FTCA. 
Another barrier to a lawsuit against the military, assuming Congress overturns 
Feres, is the so-called Mindes doctrine.  Some circuits follow the Mindes v. 
Seaman’s137 test to determine whether a military claim is justiciable.  First, as a 
threshold matter, Mindes held that judicial review of military activities is permissible 
under two conditions: (1) if a servicember alleged either that he had been deprived of 
a constitutional right or that the service in question had violated its own regulations 
and (2) that the servicemember had exhausted all available administrative 
intraservice remedies.138  After the servicemember meets that test, Mindes specifies 
four factors for a court to review: (1) the nature and strength of the plaintiff’s 
challenge to the military determination; (2) the potential injury to the plaintiff if 
review is refused; (3) the type and degree of anticipated interference with the 
military function; and (4) the extent to which the exercise of military expertise or 
discretion is involved.139  Even though the Mindes court intended for these tests to 
determine whether to review a case or abstain therefrom, two of the criteria clearly 
go to the merits of a case.  Thus, the court must evaluate the merits of a case before 
deciding whether to hear it—and they may not have enough information early in the 
case to do so properly.140  Not all circuits follow Mindes, however, and may 
substitute another test to determine whether a military case is justiciable.141 
                                                          
made sufficient allegations to support quid pro quo sexual harassment claim); Skinner v. 
Caldera, 1999 WL 1001468 (E.E.O.C) (agency (Army) is liable because it knew of the sexual 
harassment and did not take prompt remedial action). 
13628 U.S.C. § 2680(h); Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910 (4th Cir. 1995).  The 1974 
amendment to the F.T.C.A., however, added some intentional torts committed by law 
enforcement officers, such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the like to the torts for 
which a plaintiff could recover.  Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50, 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
137453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), appeal after remand, 501 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1974). 
138453 F.2d at 201. 
139Id. 
140Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for 
Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2103 (1987). 
141The Seventh Circuit, for example, however, appears to follow Mindes.  In Knutson v. 
Wisconsin Air National Guard, 995 F.2d 765 (7th 1993), a dismissed Wisconsin Air National 
Guard officer brought  a civil rights action against the National Guard.  In declining to follow 
Mindes, the Seventh Circuit noted: 
As the Third Circuit has pointed out, the Mindes approach erroneously “intertwines 
the concept of justiciability with the standards to be applied to the merits of the case.”  
. . . Rather than embracing the Mindes balancing test, we prefer a different approach.  
Our inquiry does not involve a balancing of individual and military interests on each 
side, but rather a determination of whether the military seeks to achieve legitimate 
ends by means designed to accommodate the individual right at stake to an appropriate 
degree. 
Id. at 768 (citations omitted). 
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Hill v. Berkman142 illustrates the problem with the Mindes doctrine and its 
variations with regard to Title VII actions against the military.  Plaintiff Hill 
challenged the Army’s use of the combat exclusion policy contending that it was a 
pretext for discrimination against women.  The court declined to follow cases 
holding that Title VII did not apply to the uniformed military,143 but rather applied a 
balancing test similar to the Mindes test to determine whether to review a Title VII 
claim against the military.  To avoid second-guessing common decisions that are 
crucial to disciplinary relationships, courts should not afford a Title VII remedy for 
“isolated individual allegations of discrimination,” which are better left to 
intramilitary remedies.144  Even those cases involving policies that are applicable to a 
large number of servicemembers should not be reviewed unless “the military 
decision was clearly arbitrary and erroneous, with a harmful effect present at the 
time the dispute reaches the court.”145 
Thus, the Hill court used a variant of the Mindes test to vitiate Title VII.  
Although Title VII does not permit either individual instances of discrimination nor 
discriminatory policies,146 the Hill test only permits hearing military cases involving 
the latter.  Further, although Title VII does not permit a good faith defense,147 this 
decision does, by adopting the clearly arbitrary standard. 
Even assuming that a military victim of sexual harassment could bring a lawsuit 
for damages, she would find another bar to recovery—the law that protects victims 
of civil rights violations.  Title VII148 is “the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of 
discrimination in federal employment.”149  While one might think that uniformed 
military members were federal employees, at least for protection from 
discrimination, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that Title VII did not 
extend to uniformed military personnel.150  Thus, Congress must not only 
legislatively overrule Feres to permit sexual harassment suits against the military, it 
                                                                
142635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
143See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. 
144635 F. Supp. at 1241. 
145Id.  The court believed that such a highly deferential test would allow the military the 
necessary flexibility to make and alter policies, id., without explaining why military policies 
with a discriminatory impact should be afforded more deference than other organizations.  
Griffin, supra note 123, at 2094. 
146See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (individual discriminatory 
actions); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (discriminatory institutional policy). 
147Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
14842 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. 
149Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). 
150E.g., Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Alexander, 
572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978).  The only case to find sexual discrimination in the military to 
be actionable under Title VII is Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Title 
VII could apply in limited circumstances involving facially discriminatory policies).  
Berkman, however, was not a sexual harassment case and would only extend jurisdiction to 
outrageous incidents of discrimination because investigations into less serious military 
decisionmaking would be too intrusive.  Id. at 1241. 
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must ensure that courts do not use Feres or a variant thereon as a court-made bar to 
such lawsuits, and make it clear that uniformed military members are indeed 
protected by Title VII. 
The recent case of Shiver v. United States151 illustrates the effect of these bars to 
sexual harassment lawsuits.  The plaintiff was a trainee who was raped by her drill 
sergeant at Aberdeen Proving Grounds.152  She sued under the F.T.C.A.  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maryland found against her on all three grounds:  
Feres barred her claim, the intentional tort exception of the F.T.C.A. barred her 
claims, and federal rights laws prohibiting sexual harassment of federal employees 
do not give rise to civil liability in favor of active-duty military personnel.153  
Because the court found no jurisdiction, it did not have to decide whether Mindes 
made the case non-justiciable. 
One commentator has noted that promulgating an Executive Order prohibiting 
sexual harassment in the military and setting up a system using administrative law 
judges or Inspectors General to investigate and adjudicate claims is unlikely to be 
effective because the next President can invalidate the Order and the Inspector 
General has demonstrated its inability to handle sexual harassment claims.154  Thus, 
                                                                
15134 F. Supp. 2d 321 (D. Md. 1999). 
152See supra note 109 for a general discussion of the harassment at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground. 
15334 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.  The court could hardly have been more pro-military: 
The military services of this country cannot effectively be managed or deployed if 
subject to litigative hindsight by federal judges . . . , and, contrary to plaintiff’s 
assertion, military discipline would be adversely affected by allowing tort litigation 
under the FTCA, as officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ authority and credibility 
would both be open to attack outside military authority, thus undermining their 
authority.  The resulting fear of litigation would paralyze decision-making in the one 
section of our society that remains free of such paralysis, and that must remain free of 
it, if it is to fulfill its mission.  The point needs no more discussion than that. 
Id. at 322.  One doubts whether the command at Aberdeen, particularly the non-commissioned 
officers that committed rape and other sexual harassment had much authority left to 
undermine.  And, their decision-making appears to have been so aberrant that it needed fear of 
something such as litigation.  Justice Brennan’s dissent in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 
669 (1987), which held that Feres barred the claim of a soldier who was the victim of the 
unknowing administration of LSD during military testing, seems equally applicable to sexual 
harassment amounting to rape: 
The Court holds that the Constitution provides [the plaintiff] with no remedy, solely 
because his injuries were performed while he performed his duties in the Nation’s 
Armed Forces.  If our Constitution required this result, the Court’s decision, though 
legally necessary, would expose a tragic flaw in that document.  But in reality, the 
Court disregards the commands of our Constitution, and bows instead to the purported 
requirements of a different master, military discipline, declining to provide Stanley 
with a remedy because it finds “special factors counseling hesitation.”  This is 
abdication, not hesitation. 
Id. at 686. 
For another horror story in which a federal court found that Feres barred relief, see Stubbs 
v. United States, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984) (lawsuit by an enlisted woman who committed 
suicide as a result of sexual harassment would disrupt discipline). 
154Murray, supra note 21, at 288. 
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Congress should include uniformed service personnel in Title VII.  For this proposal 
to work, Congress must also make the military subject to the jurisdiction of the 
EEOC.155 
This commentator’s proposal is for the Title VII protection for servicemembers 
to retain some of the military’s existing grievance procedures while guaranteeing an 
impartial review of their complaints in federal civilian courts.156  Such a procedure 
would have a number of benefits.  First, filing the complaint simultaneously with the 
commander and the EEOC counselor as opposed to going straight to the EEOC while 
bypassing the command would preserve the commander’s authority and permit early 
correction efforts.  The EEOC’s initial assessment should, however, result in 
preventing or minimizing cover-ups by commanders who do not want their superiors 
to think that they have a sexual harassment problem in their unit,157 while protecting 
the military from frivolous lawsuits.158  Second, once the victim has exhausted 
administrative remedies, a jury can decide sexual harassment cases under a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard.159 
What about the potential harm, if any, inherent in permitting servicemembers to 
maintain Title VII actions against the military?  Commentators have asserted the 
following potential harms:  disruption of military discipline, inability of the civilian 
courts to evaluate military decisionmaking,160 civilian investigators would be 
disruptive to the military, and military personnel must have faith in their superiors so 
they should not seek recovery from fellow servicemembers and superiors.161 
While certain of these concerns have some superficial validity, none of them, nor 
the aggregate of them, justify the ban on sexual harassment lawsuits of Feres and 
other judicial decisions on the grounds discussed above.162 
                                                                
155See Gonzalez v. Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983). 
156Murray supra note 21, at 299.  Murray suggests that servicemembers would first have to 
bring simultaneous complaints to their commanding officer and an Equal Employment 
Opportunity counselor.  They would review the matter with the servicemember and try to 
resolve the matter informally.  An unsatisfied complainant would then be able to file a formal 
complaint with the EEO officer, who would investigate the claim.  If the EEO resolution is 
unsatisfactory, the servicemember could have an EEOC hearing and bring a civil action.  The 
extension of Title VII would permit reinstatement, back pay, or other relief.  Id. at 299-300.  
See 32 C.F.R. § 588.1 et seq. for federal regulations governing the EEOC claims procedure. 
157See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
158Griffin, supra note 140 at 2106. 
159Professor Chamallas terms the ability of a civilian jury to decide such claims under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard a “valuable opportunity,” and notes that civil suits 
have the advantage of permitting victims to be vindicated without sending offenders to jail.  
Chamallas, supra note 14, at 363. 
160See Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in the 
Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 193-94 (January, 1990). 
161Douglas R. Kay, Comment, Running a Gauntlet of Sexual Abuse: Sexual Harassment of 
Female Naval Personnel in the United States Navy, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 307, 340 (1992). 
162See supra notes 121-53,  and accompanying text. 
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As to the disruption to discipline, the Feres doctrine, as discussed above, has not 
eliminated lawsuits—only recoveries.163  Thus, servicemembers continue to sue the 
military and their commanders: 
[T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by service members over 
the past twenty-five years have degraded the military mission. 
The modern soldier has also been litigious in other areas.  Although 
this litigation has not been particularly productive for the plaintiffs, 
service members have vigorously asserted their positions in direct court 
actions against high ranking officials.  The proliferation of this 
constitutional litigation apparently has not interfered substantially with 
military operations.164 
Nor does Feres and its progeny prevent lawsuits by servicemembers seeking 
relief other than monetary damages nor suits by civilians against the military, 
including civilian employees of military departments suing for employment 
discrimination including sexual harassment.165  As Justice Scalia noted: 
The Court fears that military affairs might be disrupted by factual 
inquiries necessitated by Bivens actions.  The judiciary is already 
involved, however, in cases that implicate military judgment and 
decisions, as when a soldier sues for nonservice-connected injury, when a 
soldier sues civilian contractors with the Government for service-
connected injury, and when a civilian is injured and sues a civilian 
contractor with the military or a military tortfeasor.166 
Further, how could a sexual harassment lawsuit be any more disruptive than the 
Tailhook investigation and disciplinary action, the Aberdeen Proving Ground’s 
courts-martial, or Sergeant Major McKinney’s trial?  For example, the Naval 
Investigative Service’s investigation into Tailhook comprised of 1,500 interviews 
with Navy and Marine aviators, and the incident certainly caused other harm to good 
order and discipline: 
The failure to deal adequately with Tailhook has had an enormous 
effect on the Navy.  In the wake of Tailhook, the Secretary of the Navy 
resigned.  The Senate Armed Services Committee halted all officer 
promotions in the Navy.  Many valuable officers have lost their jobs; 
many more will probably follow.  Morale is at a dangerous low. . . .167 
In short, no evidence exists that Title VII or any other lawsuits by 
servicemembers against their superiors or the military itself seeking damages 
actually harms discipline, assuming arguendo that such harm exists, it is no more 
                                                                
163See supra notes 121-35, and accompanying text. 
164Robert Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. REV. 24, 42 
(1976). 
165See supra notes 130-33, and accompanying text 
166483 U.S. 669, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
167Kay, supra note 161, at 310. 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
366 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:335 
than exists in cases in which military members sue for other redress, such as 
injunctive relief, or that harm which exists when civilian employees sue the military 
department that employs them.  Nor does any evidence exist that a civilian lawsuit is 
any more disruptive than a highly politicized sexual harassment court-martial.  
Finally, again assuming some harm from such suits, it pales in comparison to the 
disruption caused by the continuing harassment experienced in the military service.  
As General Douglas MacArthur noted, servicemember’s morale “will quickly wither 
and die if soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice 
on the part of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or ineptitude on 
the part of their military leaders.”168  More recently, General Frederick M. Franks, 
who commanded the United States and British forces of VII Corps during Desert 
Storm in the main ground attack that liberated Kuwait, discussed the necessary 
character traits for leaders: 
Soldiers need to know that we will be there for them when they need us 
during the battle and later. 
* * * *  
Integrity is one of those principles continually put to the test. . . .   
Integrity in command is the province of the commander.  Are there litmus 
tests.  Do we mean what we say?  Does say equal do?  Do we accept 
responsibility for our actions no matter what the consequences, or in these 
days, the media pressure, or the instant historical reputation?  Where are 
our loyalties?  Do we return loyalty to our subordinates? . . .   Do we share 
hardships with our troops?  Do they see us and hear from us when the 
going really gets tough?  Do we square up to the really tough calls? Do we 
shine the spotlight of inquiry into any area that is called for no matter the 
consequences?169 
He concludes that if leaders believe in their subordinates and “establish trust, 
mutual respect, and loyalty, there is no limit to what the organization can 
accomplish.”170 
To the extent that such an action would adversely affect ongoing military 
operations, the proposed modification by Congress permitting such lawsuits could 
have a section similar to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act,171 which permits 
the court to stay civil proceedings, at any stage thereof, in which a servicemember is 
a plaintiff or defendant during his military service, unless it finds that the 
servicemember’s ability to prosecute or defend the suit is not materially affected by 
                                                                
168Griffin, supra note 140, at 2109, quoting Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. 
Army, for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1933, quoted in BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS 771 (15th ed. 1982). 
169General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., The Fourth Annual Hugh J. Clausen Leadership 
Lecture:  Soldiering Today and Tomorrow, 158 MIL. L. REV. 130, 134-35 (Dec. 1998) 
(emphasis added). 
170Id. at 136. 
17150 U.S.C. § 501-593. 
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reason of his or her military service.172  If the military’s ability to defend itself in a 
Title VII action was materially affected by, say, a deployment of the unit involved so 
that government witnesses were unavailable, a similar provision could provide for a 
stay in such circumstances. 
The argument that permitting Title VII suits will involve the judiciary in military 
matters that it does not have the competence to evaluate does not hold water.  First, 
sexual harassment cases hardly involve decisions of whether to use Navy Seals, 
Army Green Berets, or Marine Force Recon for a particular mission, or 
determinations of which servicemembers should be promoted to the next higher 
grade based on their military records.  Rather, they involve questions such as 
whether a particular situation qualifies as a hostile work environment or whether a 
particular assault or other action rises to the level of sexual harassment,173 something 
federal courts do regularly.  Even if such a case has the additional element of having 
to evaluate the effect of the hierarchical ranking structure of the military on the 
conduct, both sides can educate federal judges and juries on that matter as experts do 
on other complicated subjects in many complicated cases, such as civil and criminal 
Medicare fraud cases brought under the anti-kickback statute,174 such as antitrust 
actions, such as patent infringement cases, and others in which the trier of fact know 
little about the technical aspects of the matter. 
Would civilian investigators be disruptive?  Possibly, but again, no more so than 
the military investigators in cases such as Tailhook.  First, military investigators 
often wear civilian clothes.  The Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval 
Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations typically 
wear civilian clothes when conducting investigations.175  Second, any investigator is 
                                                                
172Id. at § 521. 
173Section 703 of Title VII defines sexual harassment as: unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: (1) 
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect 
of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive work environment. 
174The federal health care antikickback statute prohibits transactions intended to induce 
patient referrals or to compensate one for making such referrals.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b as 
amended by H.R 3101, 105th Cong. 204.  These extremely complicated cases may involve 
billing experts to testify as to whether a payment is bona fide or a kickback, accounting 
experts to testify whether an equipment lease is for fair market value, see generally, Pamela H. 
Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated Crime:  An 
Empirical Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 398-411 
(1994), or comprises an illegal kickback, legal experts to explain the nuances of the statute 
because, as a specific intent crime, the defendant’s belief that the transaction was legal under 
the complicated statutory and regulatory scheme is a defense.  See Hanlester Network v. 
Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995). 
175See United States v. Swift, 17, C.M.A. 227, 38 C.M.R. 25 (C.M.A. 1967) (Air Force 
Office of Special Investigations agent who participated in an investigation by German Police 
did not make rights warnings necessary where the agent was solely an observer, was dressed 
in civilian clothes, and was not introduced as a police officer). 
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
368 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:335 
disruptive in a sense, military or civilian.  But again, so is sexual harassment.176  And 
again, it is hard to imagine anything more disruptive than situations such as Tailhook 
or the Aberdeen Proving Ground cases,177 whether they ultimately end up with an 
EEOC investigation on top of the criminal one or not. 
The argument that permitting such lawsuits will cause military members to lose 
faith in their superiors seems to be the most specious of all.  Such an argument 
presumes that service members do not know when their superiors commit wrongs 
such as sexual harassment, do not know when their superiors fail to investigate such 
wrongs, do not know when their superiors cover up such wrongs,178 and do not know 
or care that victims of such wrongs fail to receive compensation.  Or, such an 
argument presumes that those servicemembers who do know of such wrongs don’t 
care, or that they condone sexual harassment.  While a few servicemembers, such as 
Tailhook aviators, may not care, nothing could be further from the truth with regard 
to servicemembers in general.  Servicemembers do know of such wrongs and they do 
care.  Experiencing or learning of such wrongs and their superior’s failures to correct 
those wrongs clearly harms morale.179  Servicemembers take an oath to support and 
defend the Constitution, not to support and defend their commanders.180  And the 
                                                                
176See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
177See id. 
178General Franks, supra note 169, states that in this information age, servicemembers are 
informed.  “They notice.  They pay attention to not only what they are doing but what goes on 
around them.  They communicate with fellow soldiers about the mission, training, and the 
organization.”  Id. at 142. 
179From the earliest times, military experts have stressed the need to treat servicemembers 
well.  Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese general, opined that a primary responsibility of a general 
is to treat soldiers with warmth and beneficence.  SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 64 (Samuel B. 
Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1963).  The strict military disciplinarian, Baron von 
Steuben observed that a commanders first objective should be to “gain the love of his men, by 
treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and 
when well founded, seeing them redressed,” quoted in R. RIVKIN, G.I. RIGHTS AND ARMY 
JUSTICE 335 (1970).  Subsequent military leadership theory confirms von Steuben.  World 
War I studies demonstrated that resistance to military authority springs from, among others, 
degrading use of military authority.  See L. RADINE, THE TAMING OF THE TROOPS: SOCIAL 
CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 9-10, 34-38, 78-79, 115-16 (1977).  What could be 
more degrading than a military superior sexually harassing a subordinate and then not permit 
the victim the same recourse as civilians enjoy?  General McCaffery, past commander of the 
U.S. Southern Command, speaking of preventing war crimes against noncombatants, noted 
that “[i]f we treat our own soldiers with dignity under the rule of law, with some sense of 
compassion, then our soldiers are much more likely to act in a similar fashion toward the civil 
population.”  General Barry R. McCaffrey, Role of the Armed Forces in the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights, 149 MIL. L. REV. 229, 237 (1995).  Author Jonathan Tomes’s 20 
years’ experience in the military as an infantry platoon leader in combat in Vietnam, as a 
commander in Europe, as a military prosecutor, defense counsel, and military judge is entirely 
consistent with the foregoing. 
180All servicemembers take the following oath: 
I, ________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and that I will obey the orders of the 
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Constitution would seem to require equal protection of the laws for victims of sexual 
harassment in the military as in the civilian sector.  Nor are any alleged harms to the 
military inherent in such lawsuits supported and, to the extend that they exist, they 
are certainly outweighed by the disruption of the amount and nature of the sexual 
harassment that is occurring in today’s military, and by the failure to provide 
adequate remedies to redress those wrongs. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
To date, the military, and in particular the military justice system, has been 
ineffective in eliminating or at least reducing sexual harassment in the military.  Nor 
does the military have any effective mechanism for protecting the victims of sexual 
harassment and compensating them for the harms they suffer.  Whether the courts 
are correct or not that Title VII does not apply to the uniformed military, Congress 
should permit Title VII sexual harassment actions by servicemembers.  Further, 
Congress should legislatively overrule Feres and its progeny to permit sexual 
harassment lawsuits by military members.  Even though the doctrinal underpinings 
of Feres and its progeny are wrong at worst or have no evidence backing them up at 
best, servicemembers cannot depend on the courts to protect their rights as would 
seem to be the federal courts’ function.181  Even assuming the existence of some 
adverse impact on the military inherent in permitting Title VII actions for sexual 
harassment, that harm cannot possibly be worse than the harm from allowing the 
continuation of serious incidents of sexual harassment.  Courts-martial have not 
eradicated it.  Zero tolerance policies have not eradicated it.  Public condemnation 
has not eradicated it.  Large damage awards might.  Even if Title VII actions do not 
deter sexual harassment, at least its military victims will be compensated and 
“women constituting our Armed Forces [will be] treated as honored members of 
society whose rights do not turn on the charity of a military commander.”182 
                                                          
President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, 
according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  So help me God. 
10 U.S.C. § 502 (emphasis added). 
181Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  Chief Justice Marshall stated, 
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim 
protection of its laws, whenever he receives an injury.  One of the first duties of government is 
to afford that protection.”  Id. at 163 (emphasis added).  See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 
241, 247 (1967) (the Constitution intended the courts to be the branch of government 
primarily responsible for enforcing the Bill of Rights). 
182Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 59-60 (Douglas, J., 1968).  The entire quote 
reads: 
[I]t is the function of the courts to make sure . . .that the men and women constituting 
our Armed Forces are treated as honored members of society whose rights do not turn 
on the charity of a military commander. . . .  A member of the Armed Forces is 
entitled to equal justice under law not as conceived by the generosity of a commander 
but as written in the Constitution and engrossed by Congress in our Public Laws. 
Id. 
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
